University of Mississippi

eGrove
Guides, Handbooks and Manuals

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

1989

Statement of Arthur S. Hoffman, Chairman of the Federal Taxation
Executive Committee, Hearing on H.R. 1864, A Bill to Simplify the
Nondiscrimination Rules Applicable to Employee Benefit Plans
Under Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code
Arthur S. Hoffman
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Federal Taxation Executive Committee

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Hoffman, Arthur S. and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Federal Taxation Executive
Committee, "Statement of Arthur S. Hoffman, Chairman of the Federal Taxation Executive Committee,
Hearing on H.R. 1864, A Bill to Simplify the Nondiscrimination Rules Applicable to Employee Benefit Plans
Under Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code" (1989). Guides, Handbooks and Manuals. 987.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides/987

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Guides, Handbooks and Manuals by
an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR S. HOFFMAN

CHAIRMAN OF THE
FEDERAL TAXATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

BEFORE THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING ON

H.R. 1864
A BILL TO SIMPLIFY THE NONDISCRIMINATION RULES
APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS UNDER SECTION 89
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

MAY 2, 1989

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 737-6600

INTRODUCTION

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants greatly
appreciates this opportunity to offer comments and
recommendations prepared by our Federal Tax Division on H.R.
1864, a bill to simplify the nondiscrimination rules applicable
to employee benefit plans under section 89 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
The AICPA is the national, professional organization of CPAs,
with over 280,000 members. Many of our members are tax
practitioners who work with millions of American taxpayers, both
individuals and businesses. We are deeply concerned with the
effect of section 89 upon businesses of all sizes, in all sectors
of the economy.

The AICPA applauds the Chairman on a bill that significantly
limits compliance costs by focusing on plan availability rather
than plan coverage. Given that the cost of compliance was the
AICPA's most significant concern with existing IRC section 89, we
generally support the proposed legislation with only a few
changes, such as the treatment of salary reduction or cafeteria
plans and the appropriate indexing of employee contributions for
a qualified core health plan. While we will make a number of
suggestions for changing the proposed legislation, we want to
make it clear that we generally support the approach presented.
We have received hundreds of calls from CPAs requesting
assistance in implementing section 89 for their clients. Many of
our members report that their clients, both small and large, are
finding the statute too complicated to interpret and far too
expensive to administer. We believe that the end result of these
tests will be relatively minor changes to an individual's
Form W-2. This is an instance where the cost of compliance far
outweighs any benefit derived from the resulting information,
even for the Treasury Department.

In November, we mailed to our 22,000 Tax Division members a copy
of our 15-page practice guide which focused on the small business
entity which has only one employee plan; thus, it did not
encompass most of the complexities of section 89 which are
proving to be literally unworkable. Even in the relatively
simple situation described in our practice guide, there were many
questions which remained unanswered.
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Many taxpayers are unable or unwilling to understand the rules.
They are seriously considering whether to eliminate some or all
of their employee health coverage. Others plan to eliminate the
tax preferred health coverage for highly compensated employees
(HCE). These are both extreme reactions to tax legislation which
requires far too much data collection and manipulation. While
the reactions may not be appropriate, they are occurring
nonetheless.

The complexity of these rules has resulted in widespread
misunderstanding of the provisions and will lead to growing
enforcement problems for the Internal Revenue Service. Section
89 is a notable example of the inevitable linkage of complexity
and noncompliance.

Large employers incur tremendous costs in complying with section
89. One employer, a Fortune 100 company with 45,000 employees in
2,000 locations, must test approximately 300 "plans” under
section 89. As a result of the test, some 1,500 highly
compensated employees will recognize additional income of
approximately $650,000. To calculate the additional income to be
recognized, the employer has incurred additional consulting fees
of $260,000 through December 31, 1988. This does not include the
additional costs incurred within the corporation in compiling the
data. Annual expected cost to this employer for testing and
documentation is $250,000. No new or increased health benefits
were provided to employees since the cost of the increased
benefits far exceeds the tax burden to the highly compensated
with respect to this additional section 89 gross income.
Comments on general approach of H.R. 1864
Although we are suggesting a number of changes for the proposed
legislation, we want to make it clear that we generally support
the approach presented. The testing of discrimination with an
availability test is far superior to using a coverage test. We
agree with H.R. 1864’s change in definition of part-time
employees from those working at least 17 1/2 hours to those
working 25 hours; however, the proportional allowable increase in
employee contributions should be based on a 40-hour week not a
35-hour week. We generally agree with H.R. 1864's reversion
(with minor modification) to pre-1986 Tax Reform Act law for the
group term life insurance discrimination tests. We also agree
with the delay in testing former employees but would suggest a
permanent exclusion of these employees from the rules. We agree
with the elimination of the rule that requires every employer to
have at least one highly compensated employee. This is
especially helpful for small tax exempt and governmental
employers.
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The treatment of salary reduction amounts under the proposed
legislation discourages the adoption of cafeteria plans
Amounts funded through salary reduction arrangements are treated
as employee contributions for purposes of the eligibility test.
Thus, salary reduction amounts may not exceed the $10/$25
limitation on employee contributions for the plan to be a
qualified core health plan. This treatment of salary reduction
amounts recognizes that salary reduction represents a cost to the
employee. Accordingly, the required employee contribution funded
through salary reduction is viewed in the same manner as a
required employee contribution not funded through salary
reduction in determining whether a plan is affordable to
nonhighly compensated employees.

For purposes of the benefits test, salary reduction is treated as
an employee contribution rather than as an employer provided
benefit included in the base amount for applying the 133 percent
factor. Consequently, salary reduction made available to or
utilized by nonhighly compensated employees (NHCE) does not
increase the level of coverage that can be received by the highly
compensated employees under the benefits test.
For purposes of determining the taxable benefit of a highly
compensated employee, salary reduction amounts are considered
employer provided benefits. Thus, to the extent that these
amounts, when added to other employer-paid coverage, exceed the
133 percent limitation imposed by the benefits test, the salary
reduction is included in the taxable income of the highly
compensated employee thereby nullifying his salary reduction.

For example, assume an employer offers a salary reduction plan
with three benefits available through salary reduction: core
plan II, valued at $2,000, medical reimbursement and a dental
plan. All employees are provided, on a nonsalary reduction
basis, with core plan I which is valued at $1,000.
Core
Plan I

Core
Plan II

Annual Plan Value

$1,000

$2,000

$500

$400

Single Employee Annual
Salary Reduction Cost

_____ 0

900

500

400

Employer Provided
Benefit

$1,000

$1.100

90
0

90
670

Percent of NHCE’s Eligible
HCE Taxable Benefit

Medical
Dental
Reimbursement Plan

$

0

90
500

$

0
90
400
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If a highly compensated employee reduces his salary for $900 in
order to participate in core plan II, he will realize a taxable
benefit of $670 ($2,000 - (1.33 X $1,000)).
If a highly
compensated employee reduces his salary for core plan II, the
medical reimbursement and the dental plan, his taxable benefit
would be $1,570 ($2,900 - (1.33 X $1,000)). A highly compensated
employee electing only medical reimbursement would have a taxable
benefit of $170 ($1,000 + 500 - $ 1,330). It should be noted
that in this example, highly compensated employees get no benefit
from the salary reduction amount beyond the additional 33 percent
of the core health coverage provided. This is the result even
though all health plans are equally available and the employer
has made an affordable core health plan (core plan I) available
to more than 90 percent of nonhighly compensated employees.
We believe that this treatment of salary reduction will
discourage the use of cafeteria plans in providing health
benefits by eliminating the tax favored status of such
contributions with respect to highly compensated employees. The
AICPA believes that cafeteria plans which offer employees a
choice in designing their benefit package are desirable and that
the tax law should not discourage the provision of such programs.
Any discrimination tests in this legislation should not favor
nonsalary reduction health plan contributions any more or less
than salary reduction health plan contributions.

Suggestions for changing the testing with respect to salary
reduction amounts

Within the basic framework of H.R. 1864, there are a number of
alternatives for testing salary reduction amounts. The
legislation could allow for inclusion of salary reduction amounts
in the employer provided benefits for purposes of calculating the
133 percent limitation if employees can only receive cash if they
have core medical coverage elsewhere, such as through another
employer or the employer of the employee’s spouse or parents.
The treatment of salary reduction amounts should be consistent in
calculating the $10/$25 limitation and the 133 percent limit.
Alternatively, the legislation could allow the average salary
reduction for all nonhighly compensated employees to be
considered an employer provided benefit for purposes of
calculating the 133 percent limitation.

More simply, the legislation could increase the 133 percent
factor to perhaps 200 percent. With this much allowable
disparity, cafeteria plans would not find the tests as onerous.
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Another alternative would be to revert to the salary reduction
rules of TAMRA (The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988) as a means of monitoring the abuses with cafeteria plans.

We believe the best alternative is to exclude health benefits
provided under cafeteria plans from these discrimination tests.
If additional discrimination tests are needed in IRC section 125,
a benefits test for all nontaxable benefits elected under the
plan might be appropriate.

We believe, as is reflected in H.R. 1864, that salary reduction
amounts are inherently different from traditional employer
provided health benefits and thus should be subject to different
discrimination tests. We also believe that the tests should
include all benefits available within the cafeteria plan so that
employees are not penalized by the choice of a specific benefit.
The 90 percent eligibility test should be modified

We believe that the 90 percent eligibility test, which represents
a good approach, also results in inequities for employers who are
slightly below the 90 percent cutoff. We suggest that this could
be alleviated in any of several ways:
o
o
o
o

lower the percentage;
include a graduated penalty schedule;
eliminate leased employees from this calculation; or
provide a grace period for employers who substantially meet
the eligibility rules.

A lower required eligibility percentage would increase the number
of employers with qualified core health plans. It is unclear why
health plans are subject to more restrictive rules than the 70
percent rule of pension plans.
A phase-in of the penalty for failing the eligibility test, such
that a smaller taxable benefit accrues to employees of an
employer who covers more than 70 percent of nonhighly compensated
employees than one who covers less than 70 percent of nonhighly
compensated employees, would be more equitable. While this would
involve additional complexity in the legislation, we believe such
complexity may be warranted so that highly compensated employees
are not unduly burdened where a plan does not satisfy the 90
percent test by a small margin.

Elimination of leased employees from the testing would also help
employers satisfy the 90 percent eligibility test. While we are
aware that such employees can be disregarded where the lessor
makes qualified core health coverage available, we are doubtful
that a lessor’s coverage can easily be considered by the lessee
in its testing.
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A grace period could be provided for employers who fall below the
required 90 percent eligibility standard by a certain margin. It
is possible for an employer who has met the 90 percent test in
prior years to fall slightly below that level due to such things
as mergers or unexpected rapid growth in employment. These
employers could avoid all penalties for the first year such
eligibility test was not met, giving them time to comply. For
1989, the grace period could apply to all employers.

Alternatives to $10/$25 limits would be a better measure of
affordability
The $10 and $25 limits are not properly adjusted for cost of
living increases. In the very near future more and more
employers will fail to satisfy the $10/$25 affordability standard
because medical costs are increasing at a much greater rate than
wages.
Many small employers with higher health insurance costs
because of their relatively small groups already find these rates
inadequate. As the cost of health premiums increase, employers
will be forced to pay a higher percentage of the cost, offer a
plan which no longer qualifies as a qualified core health plan or
lower the value of the qualified core health plan offered.
While we understand that an affordability test should be related
more to wages than to medical costs, we believe that the law must
recognize that employers also have limited resources to put into
health plans. If employees cannot share future increases in
medical premiums, it is quite likely that coverage will be
reduced or plans discontinued. A limit on increasing the
employee cost for a qualified health plan will decrease the
incentive for providing health coverage in the near future.

We believe that using a percentage of total premium costs to
determine an affordable plan, perhaps not to exceed a certain
percentage of an individual's wages, would add needed flexibility
to the affordable plan defined in the proposed statute and put
the small employer more at parity with the large employer. Tying
the allowable employee cost to a percentage of the employer's
total premium cost would ensure that it would keep pace with
medical inflation and with that particular employer's cost for
group coverage. Adding the percentage of compensation cap would
ensure that non-highly compensated employees do not pay too great
a portion of their wages for health benefits.
For example, assume the maximum employee contribution is the
lesser of 40 percent of premium or 5 percent of wages. Assume
wages increase 2 percent per year and medical premiums increase
25 percent per year.
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Premium
40 percent of premium

Year 1

Year 5

$1,000
400

$3,050
1,220

Employee A
Wages
5 percent of wages
Maximum contribution

$10,000
500
400

$11,040
552
552

Employee B
Wages
5% of wages
Maximum contribution

$30,000
1,500
400

$33,122
1,656
1,220

As this indicates, the very low paid employee is protected by the
5 percent wage cap, while the $30,000 employee would continue to
contribute the 40 percent of premium. The additional premium for
the $10,000 employee would be absorbed by the employer. However,
with other employees sharing the increased costs, this
arrangement will encourage employers to maintain reasonable
health plans.
Defining the affordable plan as a percentage of the health
premium will not penalize the employer who wants to offer a very
generous plan with a required employee contribution of more than
the $10 or $25. One of the inappropriate results of the proposed
legislation is that the highly compensated employees have a
taxable benefit for all health coverage which is not available
through an "affordable” plan. This results even if the employer
makes available an affordable plan and a more expensive plan on
an equal basis.

For example, assume an employer offers to all employees on a
nonsalary reduction basis, two core health plans, (core plans I
and II), a dental plan and a vision plan with the following
annual required employee contributions.

Annual Plan Value

Vision
Plan

Core
Plan II

$

950

$2,000

$350

$400

450

900

150

300

500

$1,100

$200

$100

Single Employee After
Tax Annual Cost

Employer Provided
Benefit

Dental
Plan

Core
Plan I

$
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An employee can participate in one of the core plans and the
dental and vision plans. If a highly compensated employee
participates in core plan I, the dental plan and the vision plan,
a total employer provided benefit of $800 ($500 + $200 + 100)
will be received, of which $135 ($800 - (1.33 X 500)) would be
taxable. This is because the dental and vision plans cannot be
aggregated with either core plan I or II and still have such
plans treated as qualified core health plans. If participating
in core plan I, the highly compensated employee can receive a
tax-preferred benefit of $665 (1.33 x 500). If participating in
core plan II only, which is not a qualified core health plan, the
taxable benefit for a highly compensated employee is $435
($1,100 - $665). Participation in either the dental or vision
plan by a highly compensated employee who participates in core
plan II, cannot be on a tax-favored basis, even though the
benefits are available to all employees on a similar basis.
Accordingly, a highly compensated employee participating in core
plan II, the dental plan and the vision plan would have a total
employer provided benefit of $1,400 ($1,100 + $200 + $100) of
which $735 ($1,400 - $665) would be taxable.
The excludable employees should not be affected by plan coverage
In determining whether 90 percent of employees are eligible for
coverage, it is important that the employer accurately count his
total employee population. Certain categories of employees can
be excludable, but only if no employee in that category is
included in the health plan. This complicates the testing
process and penalizes employers for allowing certain employees to
participate. For example, assume an employer offered health
benefits to employees working 10 hours or more in prior years.
When this employer changed health benefit eligibility to
employees working more than 25 hours per week, the continuing
employees working fewer than 25 hours and more than 10 hours were
allowed to remain in the plan. These employers are now
penalized by being required, in calculating the 90 percent test,
to include in the employee group all employees working more than
10 hours per week.

Another situation with inappropriate results occurs when the
employer provides immediate coverage for all employees or for
some part-time employees, perhaps because they are classified as
permanent. For example, an employer may offer health coverage to
all employees at the beginning of employment. The employee is
classified as part-time or full-time based on actual hours worked
during the first three months of employment. If the employee is
a part-time employee, coverage is eliminated. This employer is
penalized because all employees are included in the employee
population. The exclusion for part-time employees is not
available since part-time employees are provided benefits for
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three months. Here, an employer who offers more health benefit
coverage than required is being penalized by expansion of the
group of employees tested.

Under existing rules, IRC section 89(h)(5) allows the employer
to separately test employees receiving benefits who otherwise
were excludable employees. This has been eliminated in the
proposed legislation. If the excludable employees can be tested
separately, the plans would be nondiscriminatory. This separate
testing rule mitigates the harsh effect of requiring such
employees to be included in the employee group.
The AICPA favors elimination of the rules which require
adjustment of the excludable group based on plan coverage.
minimum, inclusion of the separate testing rule in the
legislation is needed.

At a

Good faith compliance with separate line of business rules
The bill allows these rules to be applied on a separate line of
business or operating unit basis. We recommend that the
legislation make it clear that a good faith attempt to comply
with such rules is sufficient until after the publication of
final regulations. Final regulations should only be effective
after issuance.

Existing law modifications should conform

Under the bill, employers who use existing section 89 for 1989
testing may not use any of the bill’s improvements, such as the
25-hour rule for determining part-time employees. This is an
especially harsh result for those employers. If an employer uses
the new rules, he has the advantage of being able to use the more
liberal part-time employee rules. However, the employer who uses
the old rules is at a disadvantage. These employers should be
given the same advantage as the employer who uses the new rules.
Valuation rules need clarification

The bill provides that the value of coverage provided by any
health plan should be determined under procedures prescribed by
the Secretary. TAMRA provides special transitional rules for
testing years beginning before the later of January 1, 1991 or
the date one year after the Secretary of the Treasury first
issues such valuation rules as are necessary to apply the
provisions of section 89. The bill should include the special
transitional relief available in TAMRA.
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Discriminatory terms test adversely affects accidental death and
dismemberment
Accidental death and dismemberment insurance plans and business
travel accident insurance plans will most likely fail the
discriminatory terms test. The benefits payable under such plans
are generally based on an employee’s compensation. These plans
should be excluded from testing under section 89. The value of
such plans is de minimis in relation to the effort to properly
include such amounts on an employee’s W-2. Alternatively, the
legislation could provide that such plans are not in violation of
the discriminatory terms test if benefits vary as a uniform
percentage of compensation.

Dependent care assistance discrimination test is too harsh
Existing law allows dependent care assistance to pass a 55
percent benefits test or be included in the section 89 test with
health benefits. The proposed legislation would eliminate the
ability to test dependent care assistance with health benefits.
The separate line of business rules also do not apply to these
tests. We recommend that the dependent care assistance rules be
reviewed. Inclusion of a separate benefits test for all
nontaxable benefits in a cafeteria plan may satisfy this concern
because most dependent care assistance, other than employer owned
facilities, is offered on a salary reduction basis.
The exclusive benefit rule should allow nonemployees in an
employer's plan

We believe that section 89(k)(l)(D) should be amended to allow a
de minimis number of individuals with no service nexus with the
employer to participate in a plan without violating the exclusive
benefit rule.
According to the legislative history of section 89, Congress
believed that the cost of allowing an employer deduction for
health benefits was justified if the important social policy
objective of increasing health insurance coverage was met. Thus,
section 89(k) was designed to broaden, not restrict, coverage.
According to the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
"Congress did not intend that a plan fail to satisfy the
exclusive benefit rule merely because benefits are provided under
the plan to non-employees on a basis that is not tax favored."
The intent in implementing the exclusive benefit provision of
section 89(k)(l)(D) was not to restrict coverage of non
employee plan participants to only those who perform significant
services. However, this is required in the proposed
regulations.
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The floor statement to this proposed legislation addressed the
exclusive benefit requirement of current law by providing that,
"this exclusive benefit requirement is satisfied if the number of
individuals with no service nexus to the employer who
participate in the plan is de minimis." We believe H.R. 1864
should make the rule clear for all future years. We understand
that proposed regulations generally do not become effective
until 1990.
Allowing individuals with no service nexus into an employer's
plan on a non tax-favored basis does not violate the social
policy behind section 89. Including such individuals will
actually increase health insurance coverage. The only problems
caused by including such individuals could be with adverse
selection against insurance companies. Thus, the ability for an
employer to include such individuals should be regulated by the
insurance industry and their contracts with an employer, not
through the tax law.

Qualification rules in general
The purpose of the qualification rules is to ensure that
employees receiving a tax preference for certain benefits are
actually receiving those benefits and not cash. We believe that
these rules should conform with existing ERISA rules to ease
administration for the employer.

The effective date of existing law should be delayed

While we are aware that the proposed regulations offer a number
of transitional rules and delayed effective dates, we believe
that these should be incorporated in H.R. 1864. Depending on the
timing of legislative action on IRC section 89, a further delay
may be necessary. Such delay should be statutory.

CONCLUSION

In view of the burdens placed on practitioners and businesses by
section 89, legislative relief is needed. Given that the cost of
compliance was the AICPA's most significant concern, we
congratulate the Chairman on a proposal which saves compliance
dollars by focusing on plan availability rather than coverage.
The AICPA will be pleased to continue working with the committee
to accomplish its objectives.

SUMMARY
The AICPA applauds the Chairman and the entire committee on

undertaking the important task of providing meaningful relief
from the myriad of complex rules contained in section 89.

We

strongly recommend that the new legislation adopt a design-based
approach, focusing on plan availability rather than plan coverage.

As part of the design-based approach, the excludable part-time work
force should be those employees working less than 25 hours per week.
Leased employees should be excluded from the test until the

definition of a leased employee becomes more clear.

While several

categories of workers should be excluded, such exclusion should not
be impaired if the employer allows some of those workers into a
health plan.
In a design-based approach, some type of affordability test is
necessary.

We recommend that the employee's maximum contribution

be defined as a percentage of the employer's health care cost, with
a ceiling based on an employee's wages.

This will reflect an

employer's actual cost, the difference in regional health care
costs, and the difference in costs for different group sizes.

We believe the definition of highly compensated employees should be
simplified.

Many employers do not need to use the detailed rules

of IRC section 414(g) and would welcome a simplified system.
We do not believe it is necessarily good tax policy to design one
set of qualification and testing rules for all types of plans,

employers, and groups of employees.

Cafeteria plans and group term

life insurance plans should be governed by sections 125 and 79
respectively, and not included in the design-based test for health
coverage.

The penalty for failing the qualification rules should be borne by
the employer, rather than employees, perhaps through an excise tax.
This tax should be calculated on the cost of the coverage, rather
than amounts paid or incurred.

